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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (d) (appeals from 
circuit courts) and 78-2a-3(2) (f) (appeals from a court of record 
in non-felony criminal cases). Judgment of Conviction was 
entered against the defendant/appellant David N. Lynch ("Mr. 
Lynch") for disorderly conduct (an infraction) on April 26, 1994 
by Judge Joseph I. Dimick of the Fourth Circuit Court, Utah 
County. Mr. Lynch's Notice of Appeal was filed within 30 days 
later on May 20, 1994. 
Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding Mr. Lynch 
guilty of disorderly conduct without receiving any evidence in 
connection with that charge, but instead taking "judicial notice" 
of evidence presented two months earlier to a jury on a different 
charge which had resulted in a mistrial. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this 
Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial court, 
but should review it for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether American Fork City failed to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of its amended 
charge of disorderly conduct. 
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Standard of Review: This is a primarily an issue of 
fact. Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances. and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990) : 
Presumption of innocence -- "Element of the offense" 
defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of the 
offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102. (Identical to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-102 (1990)) 
Disorderly conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty or disorderly conduct if: 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public 
place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language 
or makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, 
means any place to which the public or a substantial 
group of the public has access and includes but is not 
limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, 
transport facilities, and shops. 
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(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offense continues after a request by a person to 
desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 201(b): 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
Statement of the Case 
This appeal is from a Judgment of Conviction entered 
against Mr. Lynch by Judge Dimick of the Fourth Circuit Court on 
a charge of disorderly conduct, an infraction. 
On November 2, 1993, the plaintiff and appellee, 
American Fork City ("American Fork"), filed an Information 
against Mr. Lynch alleging that he had violated American Fork 
City Ordinance § 76-8-305 (identical to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
305), interference with a peace office making a lawful arrest, a 
class B misdemeanor. (R. 1, copy at Addendum 1.) Mr. Lynch pled 
not guilty and demanded a trial by jury. A jury trial was held 
on February 17-18, 1994, after which the trial court declared a 
mistrial when the four person jury was unable to reach a verdict. 
(R. 49.) Two jurors were in favor of acquittal, and two were in 
favor of conviction. 
On March 14, 1994, American Fork City filed an Amended 
Information against Mr. Lynch, this time alleging that his 
conduct was an infraction of disorderly conduct, in violation of 
American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102. (R. 62, copy at 
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Addendum 2.) The City also filed a motion to strike Mr. Lynch's 
jury demand on the basis that he did not have the right to a jury 
trial on the infraction charge. (R. 67.) The trial court 
granted the motion to strike the jury demand, and set the matter 
for a bench trial on April 25, 1994. (R. 73.) 
At the bench trial on the infraction charge on April 
25, 1994, the court did not receive any evidence, but instead 
took "judicial notice" of the evidence that had been presented to 
the jury on February 17-18, 1994 in connection with the class B 
misdemeanor charge of interference with a lawful arrest. (See 
Transcript of Apr. 25, 1994 hearing, copy at Addendum 3.) After 
hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties, the court found 
Mr. Lynch guilty of the disorderly conduct infraction and 
sentenced him to pay a $50.00 fine. (R. 76.) Mr. Lynch filed a 
Notice of Appeal three weeks later on May 20, 1994. (R. 78.) 
On September 12, 1994 the Court of Appeals issued a Sue 
Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. Thereafter, American Fork 
filed its Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition in its 
favor, and Mr. Lynch filed his Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Reversal. On October 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals entered an 
Order denying summary disposition, stating the issues raised 
therein are deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
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Statement of Facts 
The only "facts" in the record regarding the disorderly 
conduct infraction on appeal are the attempts by the trial court 
and counsel at the hearing on April 25, 1994 to recollect the 
evidence and testimony that had been presented over two months 
previously, on February 17-18, 1994, at the jury trial on 
American Forks initial class B misdemeanor charge of interference 
with a lawful arrest. (See Apr. 25, 1994 Hearing Transcript at 
pp. 3-14, copy at Addendum 3.) Therein, the trial court 
summarized the earlier evidence as follows: 
1. American Fork police officers James Stewart and 
Darren Falslev exchange vulgarity with Mr. Lynch's sons regarding 
the officers detention of Mr. Lynch's niece named Kristen Harris 
outside a convenience store. The officers told the Lynch boys to 
leave and they went home. 
2. Mr. Lynch later came to the scene where the 
officers were detaining his niece, and he confronts the officers 
and demands an accounting from them of the language that they had 
used with his sons. Mr. Lynch also asked the officers about the 
status of their detention of his niece Kristen Harris. 
3. American Fork's witnesses (officers Stewart, 
Falslev and dispatcher Kristine Johnson) testified that Mr. Lynch 
used a load and shouting voice when talking to the officers about 
their conduct. 
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4. Mr. Lynch's witnesses (himself, his wife Katrina 
Lynch, Kristen Harris, and Angela Edwards) denied that Mr. Lynch 
shouted or argued with the officers, but said he had a brief 
conversation with them and was told to leave after he told them 
that he was planning on making a complaint for their conduct. 
He began to leave, then he turned back to use the telephone by 
the convenience store to notify his sister that her daughter was 
being detained by the police, which further upset the officers. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court committed plain error by taking 
judicial notice of evidence that was presented over two months 
earlier to a jury, on a different charge, as the sole basis to 
convict Mr. Lynch of the charge of disorderly conduct. Pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Evidence 201(b) and controlling Utah case law, 
judicial notice is only appropriate (1) where the prior 
proceedings are in the same case, not a different case; (2) where 
the judicially noticed facts are not reasonably disputed, as they 
were here; and (3) where a transcript has been made for the court 
to readily refer to, instead of vague recollections as occurred 
in the instant case without a transcript. All these requirements 
for proper judicial notice were not following by the trial court. 
Even if the trial court's recollection of the prior 
proceedings was properly used by the trial court on the 
disorderly conduct charge, that evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt 
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to the disorderly conduct charge. No evidence was presented by 
American Fork, nor was there any finding made by the trial court, 
on the essential element of intent. 
The trial court's judgment of conviction should be 
reversed. 
Argument 
The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Taking 
Judicial Notice of the Prior Proceedings 
Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as 
follows: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
Under this rule, the trial court can take judicial notice of 
facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute," such as 
administrative agency rules and records, Moore v. Utah Technical 
College, 727 P.2d 634 (Utah 1986), or the day of the week of a 
certain date, Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 
Utah 348, 266 P. 267 (1928). 
A trial court can also take judicial notice of records 
in prior proceedings before the court as long as such proceedings 
(1) relate to the same case; (2) such proceedings are "not 
subject to reasonable dispute;" and (3) where a transcript of 
the prior proceeding is before the judge. In the instant case, 
the trial court's decision to take judicial notice of the prior 
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proceeding was plain and manifest error since these three 
requirements were not followed. 
First, the court's judicial notice approach was 
improper because the prior proceeding was in a different case 
than the one tried to the court. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated on several occasions that "a court cannot in one case take 
judicial notice of its own record in another and different case." 
Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 
1933)(Industrial Commission erred in taking judicial notice of 
its own records as to monies paid to plaintiff for prior claims 
to the commission); Robison v. Kelley, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 430, 
431 (Utah 1927) (trial court erred in taking judicial notice of 
prior foreclosure proceeding of plaintiff's property in a 
subsequent case for waste of plaintiff's estate). The first case 
was No. 92100859, a class B misdemeanor, for interference with a 
police officer making a lawful arrest, under American Fork 
Ordinance § 76-8-305 (same as Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305). (R. 1, 
copy at Addendum 1.) The second case (the one on appeal) was No. 
93-1064, an infraction alleging disorderly conduct under a 
separate and distinct American Fork ordinance (§ 76-9-102), with 
separate and distinct elements than the earlier charge. (R. 2, 
copy at Addendum 2.) The judicial notice approach certainly was 
more efficient, but it was improper since the prior proceeding 
was in a different case, with a different charge. 
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Second, the prior evidence was not the type that was 
"not subject to reasonable dispute" as required under Evidence 
Rule 201(b). The prior evidence was hotly disputed. Mr. Lynch's 
evidence was that he had acted reasonably and calmly when he 
talked to the American Fork police officers about their swearing 
at his sons, and about why they had his niece in their patrol 
car. American Fork, on the other hand, presented evidence that 
Mr. Lynch had shouted at them. The evidence was so disputed that 
the jury could not reach a verdict; they were split two to two. 
Also, in the second proceeding, the court and counsel for the 
parties were not in agreement as to what evidence had been 
presented in the prior trial. See, e.g., April 25, 1994 
Transcript at pp. 4-5, 9 (Addendum 3 hereto). 
Third, no transcript of the first trial was available 
for the court to review at the bench trial that took place over 
two months later. Judicial notice of prior proceedings requires 
that such proceedings be transcribed as required by Rule 201(b). 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) (trial court 
properly refused to take judicial notice of prior proceedings 
when transcript not provided as required by Rule 201(b)); 
Matthews v. State, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Idaho 1992) (court erred 
in taking judicial notice of untranscribed trial proceedings). 
"Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are 
within the personal recollected knowledge of the judge." Id., 
citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 147-
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48 (3rd Cir. 1975); Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Evidence § 5105. 
It is apparent from a review of the transcript of the 
April 25, 1994 bench hearing (Addendum 3 hereto) that the trial 
court was unable to recall all the evidence that had been 
presented earlier. Without a transcript of the February trial, 
the trial court's judgment of conviction on the later court trial 
was compromised; it was not based on evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The court's decision on the amended charge was based on a 
general impression and vague recollection of the prior evidence, 
which in many respects was not applicable to the disorderly 
conduct charge. It was clear error for the court to take 
judicial notice of the prior hearing without such hearing 
transcribed as required by Rule 201(b)(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Riche, 784 P.2d at 468; Matthews, 839 P.2d at 1221. 
Fundamental constitutional rights of defendant Lynch 
were sacrificed to the expediency of "judicial notice." By 
taking judicial notice of the entire case, defendant Lynch's 
right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses 
was denied, as was his right to present evidence in his own 
behalf, and his right to due process of law. Utah Const. Art. I, 
§§ 7, 12; U.S. Const, amends. V, VI, XIV. Had live evidence been 
presented instead of the court trying to recollect what had been 
presented two months earlier on a different charge, different and 
more thorough arguments and reasoning would have been possible 
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for Mr. Lynch and for the court. Mr. Lynch would have been able 
to cross-examine the witnesses on the different issues inherent 
in the amended charge of disorderly conduct, such as whether Mr. 
Lynch made "unreasonable noises," "intending to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof." See Amended Information (Addendum 2 hereto); American 
Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102 (identical to Utah Code Ann. §76-
9-102) . 
Based on the foregoing, it was plain and manifest 
error1 for the trial court to summarily convict Mr. Lynch of 
disorderly conduct by simply recollecting what the evidence was 
at the jury trial, that took place over two months earlier, on a 
different charge, and which had resulted in a hung jury. 
1
 Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) provides: "Nothing in this 
rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court." The trial court's error in taking 
judicial notice of the entire case to convict Mr. Lynch of the 
amended charge was obvious and harmful, and thus this Court can 
review this issue even if his trial counsel failed to object. 
See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989); State v. Range1, 866 P.2d 
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993) . 
Alternatively, Mr. Lynch's trial counsel's failure to 
object to the court's judicial notice approach was below the 
standard of reasonable professional practice, and the conviction 
must be reversed on the basis that Mr. Lynch was thereby denied 
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
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II. Insufficient Evidence was Presented for a Disorderly 
Conduct Conviction 
If this Court determines that the trial court could not 
adopt as "judicial notice" the disputed evidence of the prior 
proceeding for the disorderly conduct trial, then the conviction 
must be reversed for insufficient evidence since American Fork 
presented no other evidence in support of its disorderly conduct 
charge. "To allow a conviction to stand that is not supported by 
the evidence would be fundamental error," even if this argument 
was not argued to the trial court. State v. Govan, 744 P.2d 712, 
717 (Ariz. App. 1987) . 
Even if the evidence presented at the earlier 
proceeding is deemed to have been appropriately considered in the 
second proceeding, a review of the transcript of the second 
proceeding (copy at Addendum 3) reveals that no evidence was 
presented by American Fork on the element of intent. Each 
element of the disorderly conduct charge must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt for the judgment of conviction to enter. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990). The relevant elements of the 
disorderly conduct offense are as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof: 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a 
public place. 
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American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102 (identical to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-102). 
The only "evidence" in the record of Mr. Lynch's intent 
in conversing with the police officers was to confront them about 
their comments towards his sons so that he might lodge a 
complaint to their supervisors. (Addendum 3 at pp. 5-6.) There 
was no evidence presented by American Fork that Mr. Lynch 
intended to cause, or did in fact cause, public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm--at least none which was brought to the 
attention of the trial court by American Fork, who had the burden 
of proving this element beyond a reasonable doubt. To marshal 
the evidence, the only "evidence" recollected at the April 25, 
1994 court trial was as to the volume and persistence of Mr. 
Lynch, which evidence was disputed. It is no crime to speak 
loudly at a police officer absent evidence that a loud voice was 
unreasonable under the circumstances, and that it was intended to 
cause public alarm. No evidence was before the court on these 
elements, nor was any finding made as to these elements, as 
manifest by the brief hearing transcript (copy at Addendum 3). 
The trial court's judgment that defendant Lynch was 
guilty of the offense of disorderly conduct was not based on 
evidence that established such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That decision was based solely on the court's recollection of 
evidence presented on a different charge, having different 
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elements, in which the fact-finder there was unable to reach a 
consensus. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.2 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the Judgment of Conviction 
against Mr. Lynch for disorderly conduct should be reversed. 
DATED this ^/cA day of February, 1995. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
^ D ByC^ /*A^> cs / <ry/<z~&*-^ 
imes D. Gilson 
'Attorneys for Appellant 
193\72976.01 
2
 Reversal, not remand, is the only appropriate result 
because "[d]ouble jeopardy bars the retrial of a defendant where 
an appellate court declares the evidence to be insufficient to 
sustain a conviction." State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Utah 
1989)(dissenting opinion); Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, 
amend. VI. Jeopardy attaches to court trials as well as to jury 
trials. State v. Rumsev, 665 P.2d 48 (Ariz. 1983), aff'd, 467 
U.S. 203 (1984). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
t^/Cr- day of February, 1995 to the following: 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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Addendum Index 
1. Information filed November 2, 1993 (Interference 
with Peace Officer Making Lawful Arrest, class B misdemeanor). 
(R. 1.) 
2. Amended Information filed March 14, 1994 
(Disorderly Conduct, an infraction). (R. 62.) 
3. April 25, 1994 Hearing Transcript of Court Trial. 
(Original of Transcript filed in Court of Appeals as part of the 
record on appeal.) 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNCH, DAVID N.
 ? 
55-Easr~300 North ~>&t 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Citation No. 
Criminal No. ^3//y/£^~f Mr 
The undersigned states on information and belief that 
the Defendant committed the crime of INTERFERENCE WITH PEACE 
OFFICER MAKING LAWFUL ARREST, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in 
American Fork City, Utah County, on October 21, 1993, in 
violation of Section 76-8-305 of the Ordinances of American Fork 
City. 
The act of the Defendant constituting the crime was that 
the defendant had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have had knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the Defendant or 
another and interfered with such arrest or detention by either: 
(1) the use of force or any weapon, (2) the Defendant's refusal 
to perform any act required by lawful order necessary to effect 
the arrest or detention and made by the peace officer involved 
in the arrest or (3) the Defendant's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Officer Darren/Falslev. 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNCH, DAVID N. 
30 East 300 North 
American Fork, UT 
DOB: 3-9-50 
Defendant. 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
Citation No. 
Criminal No. 931-1064 
The undersigned, states on information and belief In that 
the Defendant committed the following crime of DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT, an infraction, in American Fork City, Utah County, on 
October 21, 1993, in violation of Section 76-9-102 of the 
Ordinances of American Fork City. 
The act of Defendant constituting the crime was that the 
Defendant, intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof, engaged in fighting 
or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or made 
unreasonable noises in a public place; or made unreasonable 
noises in a private place which could be heard in a public place; 
or engaged in abusive or obscene language or made obscene 
gestures in a public place. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Officer Darren Falslev. 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
OREM DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID LYNCH, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
Case No. 931-1064 
REVIEW HEARING 
ORIGINAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of April, 
1994, the above-entitled action was held before the 
HONORABLE JOSEPH I. DIMICK, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-0O0-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the City: 
For the Defendant: 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN 
Attorney at Law 
Harding & Associates 
306 West Main 
American Fork, Utah 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney at Law 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
84003 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4840 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
PHONE: 966 
1511 wSmrn 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
^ 4 0 3 /?- CA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
which is 
was trie 
re-set f 
THE 
E 
COURT: 
R O C E E D I N G S 
That brings us to our 11:00 
American Fork vs. David Lynch. 
Pari 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
d to \ 
ties rea< iy? 
MUSSELMAN: We're ready, your Honor. 
HANSEN: 
COURT: 
a jury, \ 
We're ready, your Honor. 
It's our File No. 931-1064. 
rfhich was unable to reach a d 
or trial. A week prior to that trial, the 
again, in the 
hearing 
March 23 
conduct 
process 
together with 
rd. ' rhat is : 
Granted the 
as an 
we discussed 1 
with the 
matter.) 
infract 
of amending its charge, set 
o'clock, 
This case 
lecision, 
City 
that for 
what I expected to be the trial on 
not how we communicated it tc > Counsel. 
City's motion to amend to disorderly 
ion and re-set this time for 
then manners in which the parties wou 
presentation 
(Wh( 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
sreupon, 
COURT: 
HANSEN: 
COURT: 
of the case. 
trial, and 
ild proceed 
the Court handled an unrelated 
City ready? 
We are, your Honor. 
Defense ready? 
MUSSELMAN: We're ready, your Honor. 
COURT: 
HANSEN: 
How do you want to proceed? 
It's my understanding that 
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going to take judicial notice of everything that occurred in 
the trial; that being the case, the City has no further 
evidence to present and would rest. 
THE COURT: Mr. Musselman? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: We're prepared to argue it, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let's just make sure that I know 
what I'm taking judicial notice of. That's the way I'd 
prefer to proceed. 
The evidence began with—help me with names; is it 
Stewart that was the City's first witness? 
MR. HANSEN: I believe it was. Officer James 
Stewart. 
THE COURT: Who told us about his investigation of 
theft from the apartment complex, finding a car that was 
similar to it several days later, seeing the car, 
approaching, asking about —asking—help me again with 
Mr. Lynch's niece's name? 
MR. HANSEN: Kirstie or Kristie or — 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Kirsten. 
MR. HANSEN: Kirsten. And the other — 
THE COURT: Told us about finding the other young 
gentleman present and over to the side of the convenience 
store there; their names? 
MR. HANSEN: Travis Cook. 
3 
1 THE COURT: And? 
2 MR. HANSEN: I don't recall the other two 
3 gentlemen that were there, I know Angela Edwards was 
4 present, I don't believe the other two gentlemen's names 
5 were ever mentioned in Court• 
6 THE COURT: Yeah, they were; not that I remember 
7 them, but they were. 
8 MR. MUSSELMAN: Justin Thompson was one of them, 
9 and Trevor something or other, but I don't see it in my 
10 J notes. 
THE COURT: Mechanically, Mr. Lynch becomes 
involved because she called--
11 
12 
13 I MR. HANSEN: What happened was-
14 i THE COURT: She called her mother. Mr. Lynch's 
15 son is progressing up the street, there was testimony of 
16 words between Mr. Lynch's son and Mr. Stewart. 
17 MR. HANSEN: That's correct. 
18 THE COURT: A great deal of mention of the words. 
19 An exchange of vulgarity. Mr. Stewart says that he told 
20 Mr. Lynch to discontinue that and remain available. 
21 Mr. Lynch told us that he began up the road where he 
22 happened on to his family; is that the way that went? 
23 MR. MUSSELMAN: Not quite, Judge. 
24 THE COURT: Passed? 
25 MR. MUSSELMAN: First of all, the young Lynch boys 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
were told to : 
THE 
MR. 
leave, and they went home. 
COURT: Okay. 
MUSSELMAN: It was Travis Cook who 
and passed them on the street. 
tell 
THE COURT: Yes. Travis Cook that the 
us that they saw proceeding north on, what 
there? Third 
that 
happ< 
witn< 
MR. 
THE 
or Second East? 
HANSEN: I believe it's 100 East. 
had left 
Lynches 
is that, 
COURT: 100 East, okay. I'm understanding all 
about right, aren't I? 
MR. 
THE 
HANSEN: Yes. 
COURT: And then what brings us he re begins to 
*n. I don't remember the City's other—peace officer's 
BSS' name 
MR. 
Johnson, who : 
that 
accoi 
the i 
know 
THE 
HANSEN: Darren Falslev, and we al 
is the secretary, testify. 
COURT: Mr. Falslev and Mr. Stewar 
Mr. Lynch entered the scene, was demanding 
anting of what had been said, discovered his 
subject matter of this investigation and was 
the status of that. And the City began to 
about what occurred at a very high volume, calle 
dispatcher to 
indi< 
they 
sate that 
so had Kris 
t tell us 
an 
niece to be 
wanting to 
complain 
d their 
say what she heard over the two-way, do not 
they were about to make an arrest, 
then turned around to find Mr.--name again, 
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man? 
misl aid 
volume, 
for 
welf 
a ca 
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MR. 
THE 
HANSEN: 
COURT: 
Travis Cook. 
Travis Cook, who they say they had now 
in the process. 
Mr. Lynch's 
acknowledged 
testimony absolutely denied the 
wanting to call Mr. Stewart to account 
language, acknowledged wanting to inquire into the 
of his niece. 
ill or the niece p 
>laced to his sist 
MR. HANSEN: 
previously, but then 
I Mr. Lynch did 
recall? 
Mr. 
! Mr. 
Lyn< 
Lyn< 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
sh to 
ch~ 
THE 
presentation 
MR. 
THE 
I don't remember if he says he placed 
laced a call, placed—causing a call to 
er. 
The niece had placed a call 
after Mr. Lynch arrived, I believe 
call from the pay phone there. 
MUSSELMAN: Yes. (Inaudible) 
COURT: 
HANSEN: 
Do I recall what it is you want me to 
Isn't that what happened? 
MUSSELMAN: That's what happened. 
HANSEN: 
leave th 
COURT: 
of your 
HANSEN: 
COURT: 
The officer testified that he told 
e area, not go to the phone, and 
Is there any other portion of the 
case you wish me to take notice of? 
No, I think that's it. 
How about the defense? 
6 
1 MR. MUSSELMAN: I think that's essentially it. If 
2 I remember Officer Falslev's testimony correctly, I believe 
3 it was that Mr. Lynch, after breaking contact or whatever, 
4 moving back over to his car, then came back in the general 
5 direction. Officer Falslev said, I told you to get out of 
6 here, Mr. Lynch said, I'm going to the phone, which he did, 
7 I the pay phone on the wall. 
8 | THE COURT: Yeah. The City's testi--the City's 
9 I account of it was that they were having to deal with 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mr. Lynch's presence much longer than any simple exchange of 
"not now, later". 
MR. HANSEN: That's right. That's right. 
THE COURT: They say it went on and on at high 
volume. The defense's account of that is, although there 
were some other interesting witnesses that, I don't know who 
16 I they helped or hurt, the defense's account of that, pretty 
17 much Mr. Lynch and his wife and who else? 
18 MR. HANSEN: Travis Cook took the stand, Kirstie 
19 Harris took the stand and Angela Edwards took the stand. 
20 THE COURT: It was Angela Edwards who I was 
21 inquiring about. I don't know who that helped or hurt. 
22 I MR. MUSSELMAN: Angela was the young lady who had 
been in the car and therefore was in the vicinity when the 
24 I car was stopped, let's see, and what the City says is right, 
25 I Travis Cook, Kirstie Harris, Katrina Lynch, who is David's 
7 
23 
wife, the City called 
and that was it. 
THE COURT: 
decide, I believe, is 
Mr. Falslev, Mr. Lync 
James Stewart for a brief rebuttal, 
Basically, what I'm being asked to 
the accounts of Mr. Stewart, 
h, Mrs. Lynch, and I'm sorry, the 
niece's name eludes me again. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Kirstie Harris. 
MR. HANSEN: 
THE COURT: 
make note of? 
Kirstie Harris. 
Do I take note of what you 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I think so, your Honor. 
that, I think it's a 
want me to 
Beyond 
matter of argument as to the weight or 
the meaning of that evidence as far as this — the 
the charge now. 
THE COURT: 
MR. HANSEN: 
What is the theory of your 
theory of 
charge? 
The theory is that the defendant 
caused public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, 
recklessly created a 
or 
risk thereof, when he approached the 
officers, was shouting, attracted attention from 
different people. 
He was also 
place. The secretary 
clearly yelling, all 
making unreasonable noises 
could hear it from the two-
a lot of 
in a publi 
-way, very 
the tumult, was very concerned about 
it, and—and it carried on for a period of time, 
officer some concern and that's —that's — 
8 
caused the 
! THE COURT: Argument? 
2 MR. MUSSELMAN: My turn? 
3 THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
4 MR. MUSSELMAN: First of all, Judge, I think what 
5 their theory is is well stated by counsel for the City. As 
6 | far as applying that to the facts, I suppose they would say 
7 I that Mr. Lynch was guilty of making an unreasonable noise in 
8 a public place by having this conversation with the officers 
9 at a decibel level which they described as being loud and 
shouting. 
I disagree with the characterization of the 
testimony of the dispatcher, Kristine Johnson. As I recall 
her testimony, it was that over — that she had radioed to 
contact the officers, took a few minutes to contact them. 
When they did res—when whichever officer it was that 
responded, that she could hear voices in the background, 
that she could hear what she perceived to be either loud 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 talking or shouting, she could not identify who was doing ny 
of that loud talking or shouting. And that's how she 
characterized it. 
Now— 
THE COURT: She spoke of--spoke of an accent, the 
purpose of which was to identify it as — 
MR. MUSSELMAN: She did say that the person had an 
25 | accent. She couldn't be any more precise than that, as I 
9 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
j recall; in fact, the words I wrote down from her testimony 
2 were, "person had accent1', and I think that's essentially 
3 what she said. 
4 The testimony from Mr. Lynch and the witnesses who 
5 testified during the defense essentially was that there was 
6 not an argument, that there was not shouting and that there 
7 was not yelling and that there was a conversation and that 
it was brief; that he approached and said, Is it true that 
you cussed at my son, the officer said yes, but he cussed at 
me first, or—or yes, and why did you do that, 'cause he 
cussed at me first or whatever. 
A brief conversation, then a direction to leave 
and then a statement, I have one more question, I need to 
know your--I want to know your name and information because 
I'm making a complaint; that was provided, I think by way of 
a card, if I remember right, anyway, it was provided. 
Right, yeah. It was after the comment of making a 
complaint that he was told to leave. 
In any event, he began to leave, turned, came 
back, asked what the status was of the investigation, 
because it was his niece in the car, again was told, none of 
your business and told to leave, began to leave, then came 
back to the phone and then called. 
The question is, I suppose, regardless of which of 
those versions you subscribe to, whether you—whether as a 
10 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
11 
12 
13 
1 matter of fact you accept at face value what the officers 
2 say or what the defense witnesses said, or if t h e — i f you 
3 assume that the truth lies somewhere in the middle, the 
4 question is, does any of that rise to the level of the 
5 statutory language of an unreasonable noise in a public 
6 place, or any of the other language; of engaging in fighting 
7 or violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior. I don't 
8 think they claim that. 
9 Intending or recklessly creating a risk of — 
10 THE COURT: Citation, please. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: The statute is 76-9-102. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I think part--the other theory of 
14 I the City is that he either intended or recklessly created a 
15 risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. Well, the 
16 statute doesn't give us anything in the way of definition as 
17 to what those things are. 
18 There is a case that was, let's see, a 1989 Court 
19 of Appeals case, State vs. Richards, which I think it 
20 directly, necessarily, applies to the facts of this case, 
21 but indirectly, it helps a little bit. The holding there 
22 was that in that case, the obligation was making 
23 unreasonable noise in a private place that could be heard in 
24 a public place, which is some of the alternate language of 
25 the statute. 
11 
1 They talked about voices, there appeared to be a 
2 confrontation, an argument, in other words, but that 
3 conversation wasnft loud enough to be understood outside, 
4 could not be classified as unreasonable noise. And un--I 
5 guess once again unreasonable noise is what we're trying to 
6 define. 
7 I suppose in the officers' opinion, what they have 
8 described in their opinion is unreasonable noise. I'm not 
9 sure that makes it unreasonable noise within the meaning or 
10 the definition of the statute, even if we accept their 
11 version of it, the way that they presented it. 
12 I don't think it constitutes a public 
13 inconvenience, annoyance or alarm either. Historically, 
14 that language comes essentially from the riot or the 
15 unlawful assembly-type of language, and as a matter of fact, 
16 Section 102, the preceding section, 76-9-101 is the riot 
17 statute, and this is in that section of the code. 
18 What we're talking about here is holding up 
19 traffic, disrupting business, and essentially--essentially 
20 interfering with all of the legitimate concerns that the 
21 public has a right to engage in and not have to put up with 
22 some big demonstration. Well, that's not what happened, and 
23 I maintain that what happened doesn't come close to fitting 
24 that definition. 
25 The remainder of the language in the code is 
12 
1 engaging is abusive or obscene language or making obscene 
2 gestures. I don't think the City claims that. 
3 The long and the short of it is, what we heard 
4 from the evidence in this courtroom, even if you take it in 
5 the light least favorable to the defendant, does not make a 
6 violation of this code; and if you weigh the evidence out, 
7 it has to be taken in a light more favorable to the 
8 defendant. And we maintain that the City has failed to 
9 prove its case. 
10 THE COURT: Do you want to respond? 
11 MR. HANSEN: I think the case that Mr. Musselman 
12 cited is clearly distinguishable. The fact that they were 
13 charging it as unreasonable noise in a private place that 
14 could be heard in a public place, they didn't feel was 
15 unreasonable because in the public place, you couldn't even 
16 understand what they were saying. They figured that if it 
17 was unreasonably loud, you would at least be able to 
18 understand what the people were saying. 
19 I think that it comes down to the question of 
20 which—of credibility of witnesses. I think if--if the 
21 facts happened as the City's witnesses testified to them, 
22 that the noises that were made were unreasonable in a public 
23 place; it was in the parking lot of a Maxi-Mart convenience 
24 store, you've got public there, and you've got this going on 
25 for much longer than it should have, the officer is required 
13 
1 to stay there much longer, causing inconvenience to the 
2 store and people that are trying to--to come there to the 
3 store, and I think it fits within both unreasonable noise in 
4 a public place and recklessly causing public inconvenience 
5 and annoyance to the area, 
6 THE COURT: Do you want to add anything? 
7 MR. MUSSELMAN: One thing, Judge. Counsel for the 
8 City referred to--or I think the language he chose was the 
9 noise being unreasonably loud. There's nothing in the 
10 statute that talks about unreasonably loud. It's an 
11 unreasonable noise. Whether that means unreasonably loud or 
12 whether it means unreasonable because of the language or 
13 because of there being some threatening language or 
14 demeanor, the statute, frankly, doesn't help us with the 
15 definition. 
16 MR. HANSEN: And I apologize. I didn't mean to 
17 say loud. Unreasonable is what I meant. 
18 MR. MUSSELMAN: I understand, and you know, it's a 
19 fair inference that maybe is talking about loud, but it 
20 doesn't say that. 
21 Furthermore, I think that the Court heard 
22 Mr. Lynch when he testified. Mr. Lynch has a rather deep 
23 and a rather resonating voice, and I think sometimes at the 
24 louder end of his conversational tones, he might be 
25 perceived as, whether shouting or talking loudly, without it 
14 
1 being in any respect of the word unreasonable. 
2 THE COURT: Anything else? 
3 MR. MUSSELMAN: We'll submit it. 
4 THE COURT: Well, frankly, I'm thinking my way 
5 through this is what you observe, I mean at this moment. I 
6 am not trying to prepare a lead-in to my decision as much as 
7 I I am trying to make it. 
I don't think these ideas are too abstract. This 
9 | first paragraph, engaging in fighting or other violent, 
tumultuous or threatening behavior; I don't think the City 
asserts that. I don't think there was a fight proposed, I 
think there was no physical harm threatened, I don't think 
they propose that. 
In terms of unreasonable noises in a public place, 
I think they propose that directly. I don't have any 
difficulty construing the meaning of that language so that 
17 I an ongoing, full-voiced, half shouted argument with police 
18 and conducting an investigation in this busy place is 
19 J capable of carrying that burden of proof for the City. I 
20 | should imagine it would be one of the principal types of 
21 | applications for that language, very easy conclusion for me. 
22 | I don't think any of the language would have to do 
23 I with language or gestures would apply; so I think literally, 
24 what I'm being asked to do is give meaning to the word 
25 I "unreasonable noise". In the first place, I think you've 
15 
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1 got to choose between which of these scenarios, and I don't 
2 think it's in terms of credibility. 
3 Memory and perception is so self-serving, the 
4 question is never who's lying—almost never. That is not 
5 part of this case. 
6 Human nature is absolutely primed and ready and 
7 goes about life seeing things in ways that are favorable to 
8 them and unfavorable to others; that is how we conduct 
9 ourselves. 
10 And in cases where neutral eyewitnesses would all 
11 join one side of the argument, the other side would all pass 
12 polygraphs supporting they are truthful in their version of 
13 it. Credibility in that application has nothing to do with 
14 it. 
15 This was an emotional event. Witnesses from both 
16 sides were continuing to allow their egos and their 
17 personalities to clash at trial. The personal aspects of 
18 this were enormously important. I don't know how it got 
19 that way and I really don't like it. Cases--I think I 
20 showed that reaction to it at trial. I think it took about 
21 20 minutes of this trial to thoroughly wear me out. 
22 I don't think people treating each other in the 
23 way each other deserves to be treated get here. 
24 Having said all of that, I think I'm being asked 
25 to decide if the City's carried its burden of proof, and not 
16 
1 just that it began in a loud and confrontive manner, but 
2 that it continued past being asked to discontinue. I think 
3 that's sort of built into it. 
4 I think if the police say, that's enough, not now, 
5 and Mr. Lynch retires, I don't think that's an offense, and 
6 that is what he says he did. He disputes the 
7 characterization the City gives it in the first place, but 
8 he says he retired when he was asked to. 
9 I If there's reasonable doubt of that, there will be 
an acquittal. I think the character of these events that 
could support the City's case is that he didn't retire, that 
it went on, persisted. 
I think if I find the City's carried their burden 
of proof on that, then I think there will be a conviction. 
I don't think I'm being asked to decide more or less than 
that; I think that's the issue as I understand it. 
17 I With respect to that, most of what the defense 
18 presented denied continuing, denied the volume, too. All 
19 parts of what the City presented had to do with them having 
20 to deal with that and repeated requests to withdraw, to 
21 retire, to quit, to let them do what they needed to do were 
22 I ignored, while the point was made several times. 
I think the City's carried its burden of proof, 
Mr. Lynch. I return a verdict of guilty as charged. 
25 | Stand up to the bench, please? 
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How 
MR. 
THE 
children? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
old are 
LYNCH: 
COURT: 
LYNCH: 
COURT: 
LYNCH: 
COURT: 
LYNCH: 
COURT: 
LYNCH: 
Christensen Construct 
THE 
record other 1 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
than thi 
LYNCH: 
COURT: 
you, Mr. Lynch? 
Forty-five, your Honor. 
You're married and have several 
I have four sons. 
What's your employment? 
I am a (inaudible) and framer. 
Self-employed? 
No. 
Who do you work for? 
I work for Ralph Christensen of 
ion. 
Is there anything of any kind on your 
s? 
No, sir. 
Do you want to proceed now? 
MUSSELMAN: We would, your Honor. 
COURT: Is there any reason I shouldn't see 
this as a minor matter? 
Do ; 
MR. 
I've already i 
you want to be heard any further? 
MUSSELMAN: Briefly, Judge. Other than what 
said to 
that we've got a clas 
this between Mr. Lync 
lesser extent 
the Court, I think it's fairly clear 
h of personalities that resulted in 
h and at least Officer Falslev and to 
, Officer Stewart. It--
18 
1 THE COURT: Well, I don ft know where that started, 
2 but it was certainly in place at trial. 
3 MR. MUSSELMAN: I think there's been something, 
4 some history as far as communication between Mr. Lynch and 
5 his family and certain members of the American Fork Police 
6 Force and I think that contributed to it. 
7 Essentially, s o m e — s o m e — s h a l 1 I guess some bad 
8 blood, I guess, I don't know, for lack of a better term, 
9 between the police and some of the family members. 
10 Mr. Lynch, I think, testified that the purpose of 
11 going down there was to inquire further about the c o n — t h e 
12 confrontation moments earlier between his son, Chris, where 
13 Chris said that the one officer had swore at him, and he 
14 went down there to find out who it was, with the full intent 
15 of making a complaint to the chief of police, which in fact 
16 he made; apparently, nothing came of that, other than the 
17 fact that Mr. Lynch was charged with this. 
18 There obviously was a conversation and to some 
19 extent, a confrontation, I understand the Court's found that 
20 the City's met its burden and we don't mean to re-argue that 
21 by any means; but if this is a violation of the statute, I'd 
22 suggest that it's a very minor, perhaps as minor a violation 
23 you can have and still violate a statute, if it rises to 
24 that level . 
25 And I would think that — that the Court ought to 
19 
1 treat it as that and essentially diffuse the situation 
2 rather than adding fuel to the fire, so to speak. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I don't intend to add fuel to 
4 the fire, I intend to reserve jurisdiction over it, and 
5 whatever else I get done with this, I do intend to make end 
6 of it. 
7 Things are minor in terms of deserving 
8 accountability for them. My perspective on that changes a 
9 great deal if I am unable to affect outcome. 
10 MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, it needs to—certainly needs 
11 to end. I don't know that — as far as the history, I don't 
12 know that anything that this Court does today will 
13 necessarily have an effect on that. I think the Lynches 
14 feel that they've been mistreated by the American Fork 
15 Police; and I think the American Fork Police feel that 
16 they've had every reason to do what they've done and more of 
17 it. 
18 THE COURT: In w h i c h — i n which case, the 
19 resolution for it is for both sides to make sure the other 
20 is treated with the proper amount of respect and courtesy 
21 and civility. 
22 MR. MUSSELMAN: Couldn't agree more with that. 
23 THE COURT: I impose a fine of $50 without any 
24 other order. 
25 Do you want time to pay it, Mr. Lynch? 
20 
1 MR. LYNCH: No, sir. I'll pay it right now. 
2 THE COURT: If you will present your copy of the 
3 minutes out at the counter, I expect it will be self-
4
 explanatory there. 
5 Thank you. We're in recess. 
6 MR. MUSSELMAN: Thank you. 
7 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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2 
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4 
5 I I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify that I am a 
6 transcriber for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand 
7 Reporter and Certified Court Transcriber of tape recorded 
8 court proceedings; that I received the electronically 
9 recorded tape of the within matter and under her supervision 
10 have transcribed the same into typewriting, and the 
11 foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 21, inclusive, to the 
12 best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
13 transcription, except where it is indicated the tape 
14 recorded court proceedings were inaudible. 
15 I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
16 attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
17 stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
18 party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
19 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 19th day of 
20 I September, 1994. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the 
electronically recorded tape (No. 94-1-95) in the matter of 
American Fork City, plaintiff, vs. David Lynch, defendant, 
and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting, and 
that a full, true, and correct transcription of said hearing) 
so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 1 to 21, inclusive, and that said pages 
constitute an accurate and complete transcription of all the) 
proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape| 
except where it is indicated that the tape recorded court 
proceedings were inaudible. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 19th day of September, 1994. 
daSiUt 
Penny C.^-kbbot t , C.S.R, 
L i c e n s e #93 
My commission expires Sept. 24, 1996 
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